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The Orlando Doctrine » Destroy http://orlandodoctrine.com The Network Use of Force Continuum Wed, 28 Jan 2015 18:40:21 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=4.1.33 Destroy: Assassination by hacking an automobile – Richard Clarke suggests its been done. http://orlandodoctrine.com/?p=293 http://orlandodoctrine.com/?p=293#comments Sun, 02 Feb 2014 22:49:36 +0000 http://orlandodoctrine.com/?p=293 Ok, so where to begin?

Look we all know that hacking is serious now. Control systems hacks are the in thing at the moment, and what is cooler than hacking a 2000 pound mountain of steel and plastic that can barrel down the road at 100 miles per hour? They did it in SnowCrash, and Shadowrun, after all. The singularity must be nigh, right?

This article in the Daily Record suggests that the death of the journalist who exposed General McChrystal was engineered, per Richard Clarke. Now, I’m not generally the kind of guy who believes in ghost stories. Spooks in the wire are the kind of scary tales that con-goers hear each time they show up at B-Sides, heck, I use those kinds of stories to my advantage all of the time. I imagine it could happen, I know its possible. We saw Charlie Miller’s laptop demo on the Prius last year. So we all know its possible. But the idea that its being done actively feels like security theater. It feels like:

We’re going to take out journalists boys… Lets use an enormously advanced hack that will leave a lot more evidence and exposure to scrutiny, instead of simply screwing with his brakes, it will be good practice.


So, this is the ultimate Destroy attack. Assassination by computer. At least according to supposition from a former White House advisor. What do you think? Is this the next step in the “cyber-arms race?” Or, is it just speculation to sell newspapers?

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Military Budget limits cyber weapons proliferation, except in legitimate BUSINESS SELF-DEFENSE http://orlandodoctrine.com/?p=291 http://orlandodoctrine.com/?p=291#comments Thu, 23 Jan 2014 06:41:59 +0000 http://orlandodoctrine.com/?p=291 The Verge reports that the Defense spending bill signed by President Obama back in December, offers funds to help reduce the sale and spread of exploits. The article then uses the term legitimate self-defense, as a valid reason to allow these exploits to continue to be traded. Is this something specific to DIB companies? Is there counter attack from small companies in the future? Can I hire licensed, armed cybersecurity guards, yet?

The $552 billion 2014 military defense budget signed by President Barack Obama will continue to fund high-tech cyber and unmanned aircraft operations. The budget, which grants central Cyber Command $68 million in operational costs alongside more money for research and individual unit operations, instructs agencies to work towards controlling the proliferation of “cyber weapons.” That means stopping the sale or spread of malicious code for “criminal, terrorist, or military activities” while allowing governments and businesses to use it for “legitimate” self-defense.

The Verge – US military sees more drones, ‘cyber weapon’ non-proliferation in the future

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Obama Administration Discusses Cyber Attack Capabilities http://orlandodoctrine.com/?p=206 http://orlandodoctrine.com/?p=206#comments Mon, 04 Feb 2013 20:49:13 +0000 http://orlandodoctrine.com/?p=206 Emphasis added

“New policies will also govern how the intelligence agencies can carry out searches of faraway computer networks for signs of potential attacks on the United States and, if the president approves, attack adversaries by injecting them with destructive code — even if there is no declared war.”

via Broad Powers Seen for Obama in Cyberstrikes – NYTimes.com.

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Indian Firm Hacks Back…in 2007! http://orlandodoctrine.com/?p=205 http://orlandodoctrine.com/?p=205#comments Mon, 04 Feb 2013 20:35:35 +0000 http://orlandodoctrine.com/?p=205 An interesting use of force, compromising the attacker’s machine, but for the purposes of tracking instead of outright disruption/destruction.

“In 2007, the IT team of a Chennai-based drug maker detected heavy traffic on servers connected to its research lab. The company was developing an anti-asthma molecule, and it suspected that a hacker was stealing the research data.

Unable to trace the hacker, the company approached Mahindra Special Services Group MSSG, a security consulting firm, part of the Mahindra & Mahindra group. MSSG experts placed a dummy file containing a virus on the company’s R&D folder that appeared to contain research data, says Dinesh Pillai, MSSG’s CEO.

“When the hacker returned, he went straight for the dummy file and we traced him using the virus,” he says. The hacker turned out to be a 29-year-old Chandigarh resident who was hired by a rival drug maker. Experts say India remains highly vulnerable to cyber attacks on its critical infrastructure. “I do not even know the command and control system for dealing with cyber attacks in the country,” says Pillai.”

via Can cyber attacks on India’s critical infrastructure be thwarted? – Business Today.

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The Network Use of Force Continuum http://orlandodoctrine.com/?p=97 http://orlandodoctrine.com/?p=97#comments Thu, 03 Jan 2013 04:58:02 +0000 http://orlandodoctrine.com/?p=97 On the Use of Force

In physical security and law enforcement, there is a principle of an escalating scale of appropriate force that can be applied when an officer is defending himself, a property, or person. This use of force scale begins with officer presence, and quickly escalates to verbalization, then empty-hand control techniques, then less-lethal tactics, such as pepper spray, or tasers, and finally, in the most extreme circumstances, the use of deadly force. An officer selects the appropriate level of force for the situation, based upon his training, and experience. While each level must be considered, if the situation warrants an immediate increase in the level of force to be applied then the officer may immediately apply the appropriate level of force. For instance, while mere officer presence may be sufficient force to manage an unruly crowd at a high school football game, breaking up a fight may require that the officer immediately resort to less-lethal methods, like pepper-spray, if there is sufficient reason to believe that the officer or others would be harmed by not responding promptly. For excellent descriptions of the traditional security / law enforcement use of force continuum, take a look here:


It is important to note that immediacy of the event plays an important role in the decision to use force. An officer may not use escalating force beyond the level required by the immediate threat, and only then in order to limit the loss of life or property. It is also important to note that the officer may not employ deadly force in the defense of property alone, though if the destruction or loss of the property would significantly jeopardize life, use of deadly force may be necessary (e.g. protecting a nuclear silo). The Department of Justice defines two inappropriate uses of force:

“The unnecessary use of force would be the application of force where there is no justification for its use, while an excessive use of force would be the application of more force than required where use of force is necessary.” – USDOJ – COPS Office

Is there a virtual analogue to the physical use of force continuum?

Current defense-in-depth style network security does not escalate force, it relies solely upon passive preventive controls and technologies to reduce risk at each layer of the network in order to develop a layered mitigation method to reduce the risk. This strategy does not allow for a network defender to protect themselves with any use of force, beyond mere presence. This style of defense is akin to being mugged, and trying to hold on to your wallet while your attacker is cutting your hands. Its dangerous, pointless, and could result in more severe damage than either freely handing over the wallet, or in counter-attacking to cause the mugger to stop. At some point, it may be necessary to prevent the loss of life, or damage to property by vigorously and aggressively defending the network.

In order to define the conversation around this hypothetical end state, Brandon and I proposed a Network Use of Force Continuum at the (ISC)2 Security Congress on 9/11/2012. Both of us believe it to be an important topic and one that is of growing importance, as we are called upon to defend our networks. In short, is there a digital equivalent of a security guard for our company networks, similar to a security guard to defend our properties?

The answer seems to be yes, but it requires that a use of force continuum exist defining response to immediate threats in the network landscape. To this end, our proposed continuum calls for the following five categories of escalating network force:

The Orlando Doctrine Network Use of Force Continuum

Note the top scale describes a standard law enforcement / Physical security use of force scale used to define the escalation of aggressive force in situations requiring the defense of self, persons or property. The bottom graphic describes a means to escalate the use of aggressive network defense in the defense of networks. This version of the model does not describe risk levels necessary to escalate the response, only describing the levels of response.


The entity defends its networks by using appropriate prevention controls, technologies and techniques designed to render improbable or impossible an attack by a network assailant. The entity uses a layered defense-in-depth approach to assure that risks to its systems are defended, and that the basic tenets of information security are designed into the network’s protections.


The entity employs deceit where necessary to reduce the risk of a network assailant causing further harm in the event of a breach due to a defect in prevention or defense-in-depth efforts. Deceitful tactics, such as honey pots, and honey nets, false directories, seeded accounts, and seeded password hashes help to limit network assailants to areas, or privileges that will minimize their ability to do significant damage. Deceit, properly employed, can limit the need to take more aggressive steps in defending the network, like those in the next defense level.


The use of disruptive techniques are designed to be taken when a network assailant is able to overcome standard defenses, and deceit measures. The purpose of using disruption efforts is to control the assailant after the breach has occurred, and while the breach is ongoing, in order to limit further damage. One method of doing this, is to rapidly notify the ISP of the attack vector of the assault on your network by one of its nodes. Other more active defenses include the use of tarpits, dropping traffic, firewall shunning, or blackholing traffic. In worst case scenarios at this level of defense, the entity may even choose to switch its IP over to a DR range. The most important characteristic of the Disrupt layer of defensive options in the continuum is that they remain internal to the entities networks, and service providers, with the only external effort being notification of an assailant’s ISP.


In the event that efforts in the Defend, Deceit, or Disrupt spectra of the continuum do not limit the scope or impact of the assailant’s continued assault on our networks, it may be necessary, depending on the severity of the event, the purpose of the systems under attack, and the risk tolerance of your company to take a more aggressive approach to eliminating the immediate threat. Disarming the network assailant requires that the entity take aim at the assailant’s point of presence. Due to the immediacy issue, the entity may not be fully cognizant of the assailant’s identity, or the purpose of the system that is attacking the entity’s systems. The use of moderately disruptive practices to assure that the assailant is unable to continue the network assault could include such attack types as:

  • Denial of Service attacks
  • Floods
  • Bandwidth saturation
  • ARP Poisoning


If all else fails, and the entity is defending systems or assets whose loss could result in immediate loss of life, it could be necessary to aggressively counter-attack the assailant in order to eliminate the immediate, continued or sustained threat. The Destroy approach is the equivalent of the use of Lethal or Deadly Force in the traditional use of force continuum. Examples of systems where an attack on the assailant may be defensible might include nuclear systems, Department of Defense systems, critical infrastructure control systems (e.g. water, chemical, electric), hospital life support systems, etc.

So, how would one Destroy on the network? By using the same types of attacks and exploits that the hackers use on the entity. Some examples could be:

  • Active Network attacks
  • Stuxnet
  • Metasploit
  • DDOS

The key to the destroy level is not the specific tool, but an understanding that the disruptiveness of the attack that you are using could be in violation of one or more laws. For instance, assuming that you choose to exploit a vulnerability on the attacker’s system that disrupts the system, and takes it offline? Is the act criminal? What if in your destructive act to eliminate the threat you take down the ISP that hosts your attacker? Or a hospital network or a even a nuclear control system?

As many have pointed out, it is likely that the Destroy spectrum is illegal. Moreover, it is probably inadvisable from a self-preservation perspective, unless your own networks are unassailable, an event not unlike the discovery of the mythical unicorn. Launching an assault of any sort outside of your own networks, is generally not a good idea. Doing so while your own networks are compromised, from the compromised network may also be a poor choice.

The legality is questionable, however, back to the physical analogue, the counter-attack may be defensible. Self-defense laws exists in the entire United States, and case law exists to make defensible a criminal act, such as an assault, or even a homicide where the act was committed in self-defense. This will be the subject of another article, but it certainly bears noting that if an assault is tried in a court, and it is determined that the assault was in good faith, and in self-defense, the act was lawful, and therefore, no crime occurred.

In no way am I advocating that anyone should break the law. What I am suggesting is that eventually someone will choose to pursue a full spectrum network use of force. In the meantime, this Network Use of Force Continuum, is designed to frame the discussion around what activities may be reasonable under certain controlled conditions.

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